The RLA creates an elaborate system for resolving labor disputes in the airline industry. The Act requires, among other things, that an employer must maintain the status quo while negotiating with a union over a new collective bargaining agreement. Accordingly, an employer cannot alter or change the terms or conditions of employment while negotiating with union represented employees.
The court, in Aircraft Mechanics Fraternal Association v. Atlantic Coast Airlines, 55 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 1995), carved out an exception to the rule that an employer cannot alter or change the terms or conditions of employment while negotiating with union represented employees. In Atlantic Coast Airlines, the court ruled that the employer could unilaterally implement work rule changes during negotiations with a newly certified union that did not have an existing collective bargaining agreement with the employer.
Another key feature of the RLA is its pre-emptive powers -- that is, its ability to supersede or displace other federal and state laws that touch upon the air carrier's labor relations. In Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 114 S.Ct. 2239 (1994), the Supreme Court defined the scope of the RLA's pre-emption powers. In that case, the Supreme court ruled that the RLA pre-empts any state law claim that requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement. State law claims that exist independently of a collective bargaining agreement are not pre-empted.
The Norris case's rule on preemption is easy to state but difficult to apply. Many times, there will be claims that touch upon the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement but are not pre-empted by the RLA.
In Jefferlone v. Canadian Pacific, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 487 (W.D.N.Y. 1995), the court addressed whether the RLA pre-empted an employee's disability discrimination claim. In that case, the plaintiff was placed in a management position after losing an arm and part of a hand in a railroad accident. Subsequently, when his position was eliminated during a corporate restructuring, he attempted to exercise his rights under the collective bargaining agreement and "bump" a person with less seniority from another position. The company refused to let the plaintiff take the other position, claiming that he was not physically capable of performing the job.
Even though the plaintiff's claim turned in part on his rights under the collective bargaining agreement, the court still held that the employee's disability claim was not pre-empted by the RLA. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's disability claim turned on the employer's intent and whether it had impermissibly used the plaintiff's disability as a ground for denying him the position that he requested. Those issues, the court noted, did not concern the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore, were not pre-empted. See also, Taggart v. TWA, 40 F.3d 269 (8th Cir. 1994)(RLA did not pre-empt employee's claim for discrimination.)
In TWA v. Sinicropi, 887 F. Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 84 F.2d 116 (2nd Cir.), cert. pending, U.S. (1996), the court addressed whether a decision on pension plan eligibility is governed by ERISA's arbitrary and capriciousness standard of review or the RLA's essence of the contract standard of review. The court reasoned that because the union represented worker's pension eligibility turned on an interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, the RLA's standard of review governs.
The decision creates a large exception to pension plan law. Non-railroad and non-airline employer's decision on pension plan eligibility for both union and non-union employees is reviewed under ERISA's standard of review. Decisions on the airline's and railroad's non-union employees' pension eligibility are also subject to ERISA's standard of review. Yet, union railroad and airline employees are treated differently. Decisions on their pension eligibility are subject to the RLA's standard of review.
Even in the Norris trial the court found that the Railway Labor Act would not preempt an air mechanic's claim for retaliatory discharge where the mechanic found a defect and refused to sign a maintenance report as ordered by his supervisor. Finding that the dispute arose form the mechanic's concern for the safety of the flying public, and not from workplace safety concerns, the Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the Railway Labor Act did not preempt the wrongful discharge state claim. Norris v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 842 P.2d 634 (Haw. 1992), aff'd, 114 S.Ct. 2239 (1994).
In affirming the lower court's decision, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Labor Management Relations Act preempts state law only if a state law claim depends upon the interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement to which the plaintiff is subject.
In Lebow v. American Trans Air, Inc., 86 F.3d 661 (7th Cir. 1996), the Circuit Court held that nonunion employees who allege they were wrongfully discharged in retaliation for their participation in union-organizing activities are entitled to seek punitive damages under the RLA.
Court also held plaintiff was entitled to a jury trial and that the availability of a jury trial turns on whether the RLA authorizes punitive damages.
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