Dave & Buster’s Lenders Pick Sides: What Each Group Can Really Do
Most of Dave & Buster’s term lenders have joined forces. Why do the lenders left out still matter?
On November 4, 2026, Debtwire reported that lenders holding about 80% of Dave & Buster’s term loans had signed a cooperation agreement.1 The lenders who did not sign have formed their own group. According to the report, the company’s banker is talking with that smaller group directly. A source suggested the group might lend new money that would be repaid ahead of everyone else, and swap its old loans at a discount.2
Most people assume that lenders holding 80% of the loans can do whatever they want, but that is not always the case. This article walks through Dave & Buster’s loan agreement to show what each group can and cannot do on its own.
The Debt and the Deadline
Dave & Buster’s Entertainment, Inc. and its subsidiaries (together, “D&B”) borrow under one main loan agreement (the “Credit Agreement”). It has two groups of term loans, meaning loans that are repaid on fixed dates. One group comes due on June 29, 2029, and the other on November 1, 2031.3 Working from the company’s public filings, we estimate that about $691 million of the 2029 loans and $688 million of the 2031 loans were still owed in August 2026.4 D&B also has a $650 million revolving credit line, which works like a corporate credit card. If “any principal amount” of the 2029 loans “remains outstanding” 91 days before they come due, the credit line comes due early too.5 So two big bills could land around the same time.
On November 4, Debtwire reported that the 2029 loans were quoted at 60.5 to 63.3 cents on the dollar, and the 2031 loans at 50 to 52 cents.6 At prices that low, buying back loans looks good to the company, which could retire debt for far less than it owes.
Why Lenders Team Up
When a company runs short of time and money, it often tries to rework its debt outside bankruptcy court. These liability management deals take several forms. The best known is the uptier, in which the company buys back most lenders’ loans with new loans that rank higher. The lenders left out end up at the back of the line.7 Those deals can be brutal for the lenders left out. A cooperation agreement is the lenders’ defense. Typically, each member promises to deal with the company only as part of the group, so the company cannot pick off a few lenders at a time.8
How the Vote Works
Almost any fix needs the Credit Agreement changed, and most changes need a vote. The agreement gives that vote to the “Required Lenders.” They are the lenders who together hold more than half of all the loans, letters of credit, and unused credit line.9 The definition reads:
“Required Lenders” shall mean, at any time, Lenders having (a) Loans outstanding, (b) Revolving L/C Exposures and (c) Available Unused Commitments that, taken together, represent more than 50% of the sum of (w) all Loans outstanding, (x) all Revolving L/C Exposures and (y) the total Available Unused Commitments at such time; provided, that the Loans, Revolving L/C Exposures and Available Unused Commitment of any Defaulting Lender shall be disregarded in determining Required Lenders at any time.
D&B’s quarterly report for the period ended August 4, 2026 shows $1,378.8 million of term loans and $155.0 million drawn on the credit line. It also shows $18.9 million of letters of credit and $476.1 million of the credit line unused.10 Added together, the voting pool is about $2,028.8 million. So a majority needs more than about $1,014.4 million.
The cooperating group’s 80% of the term loans comes to about $1,103.0 million, or 54.4% of the vote. That is enough to win a vote without the lenders on the revolving credit line. In fact, the group would need only about 73.6% of the term loans.11 These numbers assume the group holds 80% of each group of loans and none of the credit line. The agent’s list of lenders will show the real holdings.12
What the Majority Controls
That vote gives the cooperating group control over most of the agreement. The Credit Agreement is full of promises D&B made to its lenders. They limit how much more D&B can borrow, what liens it can grant, and what it can do with its assets. These promises are the agreement’s covenants. With the Required Lenders’ vote, the group can waive or loosen almost all of them.13 Article VI, which holds the main covenants, states:
The Borrower Agent covenants and agrees with each Lender that, until the Termination Date, unless the Required Lenders (or, in the case of Section 6.11, the Required Revolving Facility Lenders voting as a single Class) shall otherwise consent in writing, the Borrower Agent will not, and will not permit any of the Subsidiaries to: . . .
The group also controls what happens after a default. If D&B misses a payment or breaks most of its covenants, the agent that manages the loan for all the lenders must act when the Required Lenders ask. It must cancel the unused credit line, demand immediate repayment of the loans, or both, as those lenders direct.14 Section 7.01 provides:
then, and in every such event . . . and at any time thereafter during the continuance of such event, the Administrative Agent, at the request of the Required Lenders, shall, by notice to the Borrower Agent, take any or all of the following actions, at the same or different times: (i) terminate forthwith the Commitments, (ii) declare the Loans then outstanding to be forthwith due and payable in whole or in part . . . .
Finally, the group decides whether new debt can be put ahead of the existing loans. Normally, that change needs the consent of every lender it affects. There are two exceptions. One is a loan to D&B in bankruptcy that does not fold existing debt into it. The other is new debt offered to every affected lender on the same terms. Both need the Required Lenders’ approval, which the group controls.15 The provision reads:
provided, however, that no such agreement shall: . . . (xi) effect any amendment or modification that by its terms permits any payment subordination of the Obligations with respect to the Term Loans to any other indebtedness or any subordination of the Liens on the Collateral securing the Obligations with respect to the Term Loans to any Liens on Collateral securing any other indebtedness in each case, without the prior written consent of each Lender holding Term Loans affected thereby, unless (1) in connection with a debtor-in-possession financing approved by the Required Lenders that does not provide for the “roll up” of any existing obligations in any proceeding under any Debtor Relief Law or (2) each adversely affected Lender has been offered a reasonable bona fide opportunity to fund or otherwise provide its pro rata share . . . of the priming Indebtedness on the same terms . . . as offered to all other providers (or their Affiliates) of the priming Indebtedness . . . pursuant to a written offer made to each such adversely affected Lender describing the material terms of the arrangements pursuant to which the priming Indebtedness is to be provided, which offer shall remain open to each adversely affected Lender for a period of not less than five (5) Business Days . . . .
What the Majority Cannot Do
Some rights belong to each lender alone, and no majority vote can take them away. These are the sacred rights. The Fifth Circuit has noted that equal treatment among lenders is so important that it is often described as a sacred right.16 Under D&B’s agreement, no amendment can cut a lender’s principal or interest rate without that lender’s consent. The same goes for pushing back its final due date. Outside bankruptcy, no amendment can push a lender’s term loans behind new debt unless that lender agrees, or the new debt is first offered to it on the same terms.17 The core protection reads:
provided, however, that no such agreement shall: (i) decrease or forgive the principal amount of, or extend the final maturity of, or decrease the rate of interest on, any Loan or any L/C Disbursement . . . without the prior written consent of each Lender directly adversely affected thereby . . . .
The majority also cannot change the agreement on its own. Any amendment must be “entered into by Holdings, the Borrower Agent and the Required Lenders,” meaning D&B as well as the majority. So the group can refuse relief but cannot impose new limits.18 Nor can the majority stop D&B from using the parts of the agreement that need no lender vote. D&B can buy back loans from individual lenders. It can also offer an extension to every lender in a group. And it can borrow within the agreement’s set allowances. Each of these steps has its own conditions.19
The Swap the Minority Can Do
Under the buyback clause, the borrowers, their parent holding company, and their subsidiaries may buy term loans from any lender at any time. They do not have to offer the same deal to everyone.20 The main conditions are these. D&B cannot pay with money drawn on the credit line. The loans it buys are cancelled immediately. And no event of default, the agreement’s term for a serious breach, can exist when it buys.21 The clause reads in full:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, including Section 2.18(c) (which provisions shall not be applicable to clauses (i) or (j) of this Section 9.04), any of Holdings or its Subsidiaries, including the Borrowers, may purchase by way of assignment and become an Assignee with respect to Term Loans at any time and from time to time from Lenders in accordance with Section 9.04(b) hereof (each, a “Permitted Loan Purchase”); provided, that, in respect of any Permitted Loan Purchase, (A) no Permitted Loan Purchase shall be made from the proceeds of any extensions of credit under the Revolving Facility, (B) upon consummation of any such Permitted Loan Purchase, the Loans purchased pursuant thereto shall be deemed to be automatically and immediately cancelled and extinguished in accordance with Section 9.04(j), (C) in connection with any such Permitted Loan Purchase, any of Holdings or its Subsidiaries, including the Borrower Agent and such Lender that is the assignor (an “Assignor”) shall execute and deliver to the Administrative Agent a Permitted Loan Purchase Assignment and Acceptance . . . and shall otherwise comply with the conditions to assignments under this Section 9.04 and (D) no Event of Default shall exist or would result from such Permitted Loan Purchase.
The clause also does not limit purchases to those made on the open market. That limit sank the 2020 Serta Simmons deal, where the Fifth Circuit held that an open market purchase has to happen in the market where these loans trade.22 A New York appeals court upheld a similar buyback in the Mitel case. There, the company paid a majority of its lenders with new loans that ranked ahead of the rest, but the lenders taking part in Mitel held a majority and consented to the changes the deal needed.23
Suppose the minority group holds 20% of each group of loans, or about $275.8 million. At the November 4 midpoint prices, and before any premium or fees, D&B could buy those loans for about $155.7 million.24 That would cut D&B’s debt by about $120 million. D&B could pay in cash or with new debt. However, the minority group will want more than a discount. According to Debtwire’s source, it might also lend new money ranking ahead of the existing loans.25
Getting to the Front of the Line Is Harder
The Credit Agreement offers three possible routes to the front of the line, and each has limits. The first is to amend the agreement to push the old loans behind new debt. That needs the majority’s vote, plus a written offer to every affected lender that stays open for at least five business days.26
A second route uses two general allowances. One lets D&B take on up to $266.5 million of extra debt. The other lets it secure that debt with liens up to the same amount. Neither allowance says whether the new debt or its liens must rank equal with or behind the existing loans. The minority would also point to Section 8.11, which covers liens the agreement does not prohibit “including with respect to priority.”27 The separate collateral and intercreditor agreements may answer this question; however, we have not reviewed them.28 The two allowances and Section 8.11 read:
(k)(i) Indebtedness of the Borrower Agent or any Subsidiary, in an aggregate principal amount outstanding that, immediately after giving effect to the incurrence of such Indebtedness and the use of proceeds thereof, together with the aggregate principal amount of any other Indebtedness outstanding pursuant to this Section 6.01(k), would not exceed the greater of $266,500,000 and 0.50 times the Adjusted EBITDA calculated on a Pro Forma Basis for the then most recently ended Test Period, and (ii) any Permitted Refinancing Indebtedness in respect thereof;
Liens with respect to property or assets of the Borrower Agent or any Subsidiary securing obligations in an aggregate principal amount outstanding that, immediately after giving effect to the incurrence of such obligations, would not exceed the greater of $266,500,000 and 0.50 times the Adjusted EBITDA calculated on a Pro Forma Basis for the then most recently ended Test Period;
The Lenders and the other Secured Parties hereby irrevocably authorize and instruct the Administrative Agent and the Collateral Agent to, without any further consent of any Lender or any other Secured Party, enter into . . . any other intercreditor agreement contemplated hereby with the collateral agent or other representatives of the holders of Indebtedness that is to be secured by a Lien on the Collateral that is not prohibited (including with respect to priority) under this Agreement . . . .
Even if the new liens could rank first, the room is limited. Paying for the minority’s loans with $155.7 million of new senior debt would use most of the $266.5 million allowance. That would leave at most about $110.8 million for new money. If D&B has already used part of the allowance, there would be even less.29 The new debt would also rank ahead of the banks on the credit line, because they share the same collateral as the term loans. An amendment that pushes them behind other debt needs each bank’s consent. Unlike the term lenders’ right, theirs has no exception for an equal offer.30 Their protection reads:
(x) effect any amendment or modification that by its terms permits any payment subordination of the Obligations with respect to the Revolving Facility to any other indebtedness or any subordination of the Liens on the Collateral securing the Obligations with respect to the Revolving Facility to any Liens on Collateral securing any other indebtedness in each case, without the prior written consent of each Revolving Facility Lender affected thereby unless in connection with a debtor-in-possession financing approved by the Required Revolving Facility Lenders that does not provide for the “roll up” of any existing obligations in any proceeding under any Debtor Relief Law;
A third route goes around the Credit Agreement instead of through it. D&B may name a subsidiary as an unrestricted subsidiary, meaning a subsidiary that is not bound by the Credit Agreement’s rules and does not guarantee the loans. It can do so as long as no event of default would result. D&B can then move cash or other assets into it. The agreement treats that move as an investment. One allowance lets D&B invest up to $320 million this way, less what it has already used under that allowance and two related ones.31 The designation right and the investment allowance states:
“Unrestricted Subsidiary” shall mean . . . (2) any other Subsidiary of the Borrower Agent, whether owned on the Closing Date or acquired or created after the Closing Date, that is designated by the Borrower Agent as an Unrestricted Subsidiary hereunder by written notice to the Administrative Agent; provided, that the Borrower Agent shall only be permitted to so designate a new Unrestricted Subsidiary after the Closing Date, so long as (a) no Event of Default would result therefrom, (b) such Unrestricted Subsidiary shall be capitalized (to the extent capitalized by the Borrower Agent or any of its Subsidiaries) through Investments as permitted by, and in compliance with, Section 6.04, and any prior or concurrent Investments in such Subsidiary by the Borrower Agent or any of its Subsidiaries shall be deemed to have been made under Section 6.04, (c) without duplication of clause (b), any net assets owned by such Unrestricted Subsidiary at the time of the initial designation thereof shall be treated as Investments pursuant to Section 6.04 and (d) no Subsidiary may be designated as an Unrestricted Subsidiary if such Subsidiary owns Intellectual Property material to the business of the Borrower Agent and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole; . . .
(ee) Investments in any Unrestricted Subsidiaries after giving effect to the applicable Investments, in an aggregate outstanding amount (valued at the time of the making thereof, and without giving effect to any subsequent changes in value) not to exceed, when taken together with the aggregate outstanding amount of any other Investments made pursuant to Section 6.04(cc) and Section 6.04(dd) (valued as provided therein), the sum of (X) the greater of $320,000,000 and 0.60 times the Adjusted EBITDA calculated on a Pro Forma Basis for the then most recently ended Test Period plus (Y) . . . .
If the agreement allows the transfer, the existing lenders’ liens on the assets are released automatically once they leave the companies that back the loans. The minority could then lend to the subsidiary against those assets and be paid first from them.32 Section 9.18(a) provides:
The Lenders, the Issuing Banks and the other Secured Parties hereby irrevocably agree that the Liens granted to the Collateral Agent by the Loan Parties on any Collateral shall be automatically released: . . . (ii) upon the Disposition of such Collateral (other than an operating lease) by any Loan Party to a person that is not (and is not required to become) a Loan Party in a transaction not prohibited by this Agreement . . . .
The catch is who can make the buyback. The clause lets “Holdings or its Subsidiaries, including the Borrowers,” buy the loans. Holdings is Dave & Buster’s Holdings, Inc., the parent holding company. The borrowers are Dave & Buster’s, Inc. and any other company added as a borrower. A “Subsidiary” is a subsidiary of Dave & Buster’s, Inc., but the agreement says an unrestricted subsidiary is not one. So an unrestricted subsidiary cannot make the buyback, and the minority’s new money would first have to move to a company that can. If it moved as a loan, that loan would count against D&B’s borrowing limits.33 The clause states:
any of Holdings or its Subsidiaries, including the Borrowers, may purchase by way of assignment and become an Assignee with respect to Term Loans at any time and from time to time from Lenders . . . .
The Dave & Buster’s and Main Event brands are very likely off limits. Many loan agreements now carry a “J. Crew blocker,” named after the retailer whose deal made this move famous. The clause stops key assets from leaving.34 This bars moving intellectual property that is material to the business as a whole into an unrestricted subsidiary, or naming a subsidiary that owns it as unrestricted.35 The clause provides that:
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Borrower Agent shall not, nor shall it permit any Subsidiary to, (x) transfer (including by way of sale, investment, exclusive license or designation of a Subsidiary as an Unrestricted Subsidiary) any Intellectual Property that is material to the business of the Borrower Agent and Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, to any Unrestricted Subsidiary or (y) transfer legal or beneficial ownership of, or an exclusive license to, any Intellectual Property that is material to the business of the Borrower Agent and the Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, to Holdings or any Subsidiary that is not a Loan Party (including by way of sale or investment).
So whatever moves out has to be worth lending against.
What a Minority Deal Does Not Fix
A deal with the minority does not solve the 2029 problem. If the cooperating group holds 80% of each group of loans, it holds about $553 million of the 2029 loans. Those loans, and the credit line’s early due date, stay in place until that group agrees to extend them or D&B pays them in full.36
How the Majority Would Fight Back
The majority’s most effective response would be to claim that a minority deal broke one of the agreement’s limits on borrowing, liens, or investments. Breaking any of those limits is a default right away.37 Section 7.01(d) makes it an event of default if:
default shall be made in the due observance or performance by Holdings, the Borrower Agent or any of its Subsidiaries of any covenant, condition or agreement contained in, Section 5.01(a), 5.05(a) or 5.08 or in Article VI (with respect to Section 6.11, subject to Section 7.03); . . .
If a court agreed, the majority could demand repayment of everything.
A breach of contract claim turns on whether D&B follows the buyback clause exactly. If a condition fails, the purchase may lose the clause’s protection, and the rule that lenders share payments equally could apply. Serta shows what can follow, although its agreement and its deal were different. Its exchange did not fit the “open market purchase” exception in its own agreement, and on remand the bankruptcy court held each participating lender liable for its own share of the damages.38 If D&B meets every condition, the claim is much weaker. The buyback clause applies “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Agreement, including Section 2.18(c),” and Section 2.18(c) is the sharing rule.39 In Serta, the company had promised to cover the participating lenders’ losses from the deal. Minority lenders here would likely ask D&B for the same promise.40
The majority could also claim a breach of the duty of good faith that New York reads into every contract. Courts let such claims go forward at an early stage in the Boardriders and STG Logistics cases.41 Additionally, in May 2026, New York’s highest court revived a similar claim against a lender.42
If D&B filed for bankruptcy within 90 days of a swap, the minority would face one more risk. The bankruptcy estate could try to undo any better ranking the minority gained in the swap as an unfair preference, if the other legal requirements for a preference are met.43
The Playbook at a Glance
An uptier like Serta’s or Mitel’s combines two steps. The lenders taking part vote to allow new debt that ranks first, and then swap their old loans for it.44 Under D&B’s agreement, the swap is open to the minority, but making the new debt rank first is not easy. The table sets out each move and where it stands.
| Move | Under D&B’s agreement | Where to look |
|---|---|---|
| Buy back chosen lenders’ loans at a discount (the swap) | Open, if D&B is not in default, does not use the credit line, and cancels the loans | Section 9.04(i) |
| Make the new debt rank first by amendment (as in Serta and Mitel) | Needs the majority’s vote and an equal offer to every affected lender | Section 9.08(b)(xi) |
| Make the new debt rank first under the general allowances | Unclear: the lien allowance is silent on rank, and the separate collateral and intercreditor agreements may decide the question; capped at $266.5 million | Sections 6.01(k), 6.02(ll) |
| Lend against assets moved to an unrestricted subsidiary (as in J. Crew) | Open within the investment limits, but not for material intellectual property | Sections 6.04(ee), 6.04, 9.18(a) |
| Offer an extension to every lender in a group | Open; each lender decides for itself | Section 2.21(e) |
The Takeaway
A cooperation agreement gives the majority control of the vote, not of the whole agreement. Without any vote, D&B can still buy back the minority’s loans at a discount. What the minority cannot easily do is jump ahead of the line. Even a deal that works still leaves the 2029 loans with the majority. So a minority deal may matter most as a bargaining chip, pushing the majority toward an extension.
This article is general information, not legal advice about any particular situation. Readers should consult their own advisers.
Notes and Sources
- Kunyi Yang, Lavanya Nair & Jay Antenen, Dave & Buster’s Minority Lenders Organize with Paul Weiss, Engage with Company’s Advisers, Debtwire (Nov. 4, 2026), https://ionanalytics.com/insights/debtwire/dave-busters-minority-lenders-organize-with-paul-weiss-engage-with-companys-advisers/. ↩
- Id. (reporting statements of unnamed sources; Moelis declined to comment, and the company and the lender groups’ counsel did not respond). ↩
- Second Amendment to Credit Agreement § 1(II) (Jan. 19, 2024); Fourth Amendment to Credit Agreement § 1(II) (Nov. 1, 2024) [hereinafter Fourth Amendment]. ↩
- See Dave & Buster’s Ent., Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) Note 4 (Sept. 14, 2026) [hereinafter Form 10-Q]; Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, § 1(III). The 2031 term loans were made in the amount of $700.0 million and amortize at $1.75 million a quarter; seven installments leave $687.75 million, so $691.05 million of the $1,378.8 million total are 2029 term loans. The split is an estimate; the administrative agent’s register would confirm it. ↩
- Credit Agreement among Dave & Buster’s Holdings, Inc., Dave & Buster’s, Inc., the Lenders Party Thereto & Deutsche Bank AG N.Y. Branch § 1.01 (June 29, 2022) (as amended through Fifth Amendment, Dec. 9, 2025) (defining “Early Maturing Debt” to include the 2029 term loans and certain refinancings of them, and setting the “Springing Revolving Facility Maturity Date”) [hereinafter Credit Agreement]; Form 10-Q, supra note 4, Note 4 ($650 million credit line). ↩
- Yang et al., supra note 1 (reporting bid/ask quotations of 60.5/63.3 for the 2029 term loans and 50/52 for the 2031 term loans). ↩
- Ocean Trails CLO VII v. MLN TopCo Ltd., 233 A.D.3d 614, 615 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 2024) (Mitel uptier). ↩
- See Am. Compl. ¶ 4, Optimum Commc’ns, Inc. v. Apollo Cap. Mgmt., L.P., No. 1:25-cv-09785 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2026), ECF No. 73 (alleging the terms of a lender cooperation agreement). ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 1.01 (definition of “Required Lenders”). ↩
- Form 10-Q, supra note 4, Note 4. ↩
- Calculated from Form 10-Q, supra note 4, Note 4: $1,378.8 + $155.0 + $18.9 + $476.1 = $2,028.8 million; 80% × $1,378.8 million = $1,103.0 million, or 54.4%; $1,014.4 million ÷ $1,378.8 million = 73.6%. The figures assume no Defaulting Lenders, whose holdings the definition disregards. ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 9.04(b)(iv). ↩
- Id. art. VI, § 9.08(b) (financial covenant in § 6.11 waivable only by the Required Revolving Facility Lenders). ↩
- Id. § 7.01. ↩
- Id. § 9.08(b)(xi). ↩
- In re Serta Simmons Bedding, L.L.C., 125 F.4th 555, 565 (5th Cir. 2024). ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 9.08(b)(i), (xi). ↩
- Id. § 9.08(b). ↩
- Id. art. VI, §§ 2.21(e), 9.04(i), 9.08(b). ↩
- Id. § 9.04(i). ↩
- Id. § 9.04(i)(A)–(B), (D). ↩
- Serta, 125 F.4th at 579. ↩
- Ocean Trails, 233 A.D.3d at 616 (construing provisions comparable to, but not identical with, D&B’s). ↩
- Calculated from figures supra notes 4, 6: 20% × $691.05 million × 61.9% + 20% × $687.75 million × 51.0% = $155.7 million for $275.8 million of principal. The figures are illustrative and exclude any premium or fees. ↩
- See Yang et al., supra note 1 (attributing the proposal to an unnamed source). ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 9.08(b)(xi)(2). ↩
- Id. §§ 6.01(k), 6.02(ll), 8.11; see Form 10-Q, supra note 4, Item 2 (Credit Adjusted EBITDA of $435.8 million, so 0.50 times EBITDA is below $266.5 million). But see Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 1.01 (defining “Other First Liens” and “Junior Liens” as liens that rank equal with or junior to the term loans). ↩
- See Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 8.11 (referring to the First Lien/First Lien Intercreditor Agreement). The Collateral Agreement and the intercreditor agreements were not reviewed for this article. ↩
- Calculated from figures supra notes 24, 27: $266.5 million − $155.7 million = $110.8 million, before fees and any prior use of the allowance. ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 9.08(b)(x). ↩
- Id. § 1.01 (definition of “Unrestricted Subsidiary”), § 6.04(ee); Form 10-Q, supra note 4, Item 2 (Credit Adjusted EBITDA of $435.8 million, so 0.60 times EBITDA is below $320 million). ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 9.18(a)(ii); see id. art. VI (binding the Borrower Agent and its Subsidiaries), § 1.01 (definition of “Subsidiary”). ↩
- Id. pmbl., § 1.01 (definitions of “Borrower” and “Subsidiary”), § 9.04(i); see id. § 6.01. ↩
- Axos Fin., Inc. v. Reception Purchaser, LLC, 88 Misc. 3d 1203(A), 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50019(U), at *5 n.8 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Jan. 3, 2026) (STG Logistics). ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 1.01 (definition of “Unrestricted Subsidiary”), § 6.04. ↩
- Calculated from figures supra note 4: 80% × $691.05 million = $552.8 million. See Credit Agreement, supra note 5, §§ 1.01 (definition of “Springing Revolving Facility Maturity Date”), 9.08(b)(i). ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, § 7.01(d). ↩
- Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC v. AG Ctr. St. P’ship (In re Serta Simmons Bedding, LLC), Adv. No. 23-09001, 2026 WL 1968535 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. July 7, 2026) (holding, after the Fifth Circuit ruled the exchange was not an open market purchase, that the participating lenders breached the credit agreement’s pro rata sharing provision and are each severally liable for their share of the damages). ↩
- Credit Agreement, supra note 5, §§ 2.18(c), 9.04(i). ↩
- Serta Simmons Bedding, 2026 WL 1968535 (describing an indemnity in Serta’s loan agreements). ↩
- Axos, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 50019(U), at *19 (STG Logistics); ICG Glob. Loan Fund 1 DAC v. Boardriders, Inc., No. 655175/2020, 2022 N.Y. Slip Op. 33492(U), at 23 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. Oct. 17, 2022). ↩
- 111 W. 57th Inv. LLC v. 111 W57 Mezz Inv. LLC, 2026 N.Y. Slip Op. 03376, at *3, *9 (N.Y. May 28, 2026) (reinstating an implied covenant claim at the pleading stage). ↩
- 11 U.S.C. § 547(b), (f) (permitting avoidance only if every element of § 547(b) is met, subject to the defenses in § 547(c)). ↩
- Serta, 125 F.4th at 565. ↩