Month: October 2025

U.S. Sanctions President of Colombia and Other Individuals

On October 24, 2025 the U.S. Department of Treasury announced that, through its Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), it is imposing individual sanctions against the President of Colombia, Gustavo Petro, as well as his wife, son, and “a close associate.”

As a result of the sanctions, all property and interests in property of the following newly designated blocked persons, that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons, are blocked and must be reported to OFAC:

• Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego (“Gustavo Petro,” President of Colombia)
• Nicolas Fernando Petro Burgos (“Nicolas Petro,” the former’s son)
• Veronica del Socorro Alcocer Garcia (Gustavo Petro’s wife)
• Armando Alberto Benedetti Villaneda (“Armando Benedetti,” who has held Colombian government positions)

Importantly, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons above also are blocked unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC.

The sanctions are pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, a 2021 Order issued during President Biden’s Administration and focused on the drug trade. President Petro is being designated for “having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production.” The other individuals are being designated for “having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, Gustavo Petro.”

Particularly for those doing business in Latin America, it would be prudent to:

• Evaluate whether they have any business with the above-listed individuals;
• Evaluate whether companies with which they do business have a nexus with / ownership by the above-listed individuals (and exercise extreme caution or cease doing business if such company has any such nexus; if the above-listed individuals own (even in combination) 50% or more of the company, the company will be subject to blocking sanctions.

The sanctions could affect U.S. and foreign companies as follows:

1. U.S. parties would be prohibited from doing business with any of the sanctioned parties or any blocked entities 50% or more owned by sanctioned parties;
2. U.S. parties in possession of property owned by the sanctions targets or in which the targets have an interest would be required to block the property and report it to OFAC;
3. Foreign parties could be prohibited from engaging in transactions with the sanctioned parties (or companies owned by them) if transactions involve U.S. parties, goods, services, or U.S. dollar transactions;
4. Transactions with sanctioned parties or companies they own could be subject to blocking or “freezes” by U.S. parties, including U.S. banks; and
5. Foreign parties could be at risk of being sanctioned themselves if they provide material support, goods, or services to the sanctioned and blocked parties.

We hope this is helpful and please let us know if you have any questions.

Oliver M. Krischik okrischik@gkglaw.com

John H. Kester jkester@gkglaw.com

By John H. Kester

The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) on Monday announced an interim final rule (“IFR”) stating that any entity that is at least 50 percent owned by one or more entities on the Entity List or the Military End-User List (“MEU List”), directly or indirectly, individually or in aggregate, will itself automatically be subject to Entity List/MEU List restrictions. The rule has downstream effect, meaning that if, e.g., an Entity List listed entity owns 50 percent of Company B which in turn owns 50 percent of Company C, even Company C is subject to Entity List restrictions. See, FAQ Answer 52.

The Entity and MEU Lists impose supplemental export license requirements on parties whose activities BIS has deemed contrary to U.S. national security or foreign policy interests, or who present an unacceptable risk that goods will be used in or diverted to a military end use.

The IFR was published on the Federal Register on September 30th and was effective as of September 29th. It will not restrict shipments of items en route aboard a carrier to a port of export, reexport or transfer (in-country), on September 29, 2025, pursuant to actual orders for export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) to or within a foreign destination, provided the export, reexport, or transfer (in-country) is completed no later than on October 29, 2025. Additionally, there is a Temporary General License (“TGL”) authorizing certain export, reexport, and transfer (in-country) transactions involving non-listed 50-percent or more owned foreign affiliates of parties on the Entity or MEU Lists; the TGL is set to expire November 28.

BIS characterized the IFR as closing a significant loophole and broadly strengthening the export control regime. The Entity and MEU Lists previously excluded all entities that were not specifically named, even if there were extensive corporate and financial ties with listed entities. This change is significant in part because it means that entities that are not specifically listed may nonetheless be subject to the restrictions imposed by those Lists, and a BIS license may be required to export to them. In an FAQ related to this so-called “Affiliates Rule,” for example,  BIS cautioned that the Consolidated Screening List “will no longer comprise an exhaustive listing of foreign entities subject to Entity List license requirements”; it additionally stated that “[c]ertain non-listed foreign affiliates of listed entities are also subject to the Entity List license requirements and other requirements because they meet the Affiliates Rule criteria.” See, FAQ Answers 46 and 1, respectively.

BIS additionally explained that for purposes of the Affiliates Rule it is concerned with ownership as opposed to control: “An entity that is controlled (but not owned 50 percent or more) by one or more listed entities is not considered to automatically meet the Affiliates Rule criteria.” See, FAQ Answer 43.

In addition to the aforementioned change, BIS noted that it will see as a red flag significant minority ownership by an Entity List/MEU List entity or an SDN, and that exporters consequently must conduct additional due diligence. See, FAQ Answer 43. Moreover, where an exporter, reexporter or transferor knows a foreign entity has at least one owner on the Entity or MEU Lists, “it has an affirmative duty to determine the percentage of ownership by those listed entities” and if unable to so determine, to apply for a license from BIS. See, FAQ Answer 41.

In light of these changes, exporters would be prudent to:

1. Reevaluate their compliance screening process such that they ensure they are not, g., merely searching against names on the Entity and MEU Lists;
2. Ensure that they have screening mechanisms in place to catch those entities which are 50-percent-or-more owned by an entity on the Entity and/or MEU List (or by an entity owned by such listed entity pursuant to the downstream effect of the 50 percent rule), even where such owned entities are not specifically listed on the Entity and MEU lists;
3. Ensure that they are screening for significant minority ownership by Entity, MEU, and SDN list entities, such that they are able to recognize when additional due diligence is required.

Please let us know if you have any questions about the rule, implementing compliance changes to account for the new restrictions and due diligence obligations, or anything else.

John H. Kester jkester@gkglaw.com

Oliver M. Krischik okrischik@gkglaw.com

By GKG Law

GKG Law last month was the only law firm member of the Department of Commerce sponsored U.S. Business Delegation to the Middle Corridor, a week-long trade mission to Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia that brought together U.S. trade and logistics companies with their regional counterparts and high-ranking government officials. The mission was organized by the American Chamber of Commerce in Kazakhstan, the United States-Azerbaijan Chamber of Commerce, and the America-Georgia Business Council.

The Middle Corridor is a multimodal trade route spanning Central Asia and the South Caucasus and transiting the Caspian Sea. Delegation member and GKG Law attorney John H. Kester mirrored the route of Middle Corridor cargo, crossing the Caspian Sea from Aktau, Kazakhstan to Alat, Azerbaijan via overnight cargo ferry, and eventually continuing overland to Tbilisi, Georgia.

Once part of the ancient Silk Road, the Middle Corridor has garnered renewed interest and infrastructural development as a result of U.S. sanctions on Russia and Iran, which have complicated cargo movement through those countries and increased transit times. Ocean routes around Asia and through the Suez Canal have been threatened by rebel attacks and piracy in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

Cargo transiting the Middle Corridor averages just 14-18 days from China to Europe, compared with 19 days via Russia and more than 30 days by ocean routes, according to Caspian Policy Center. Trade volumes in the Middle Corridor surged from 586,000 tons in 2021 to 3.3 million in 2024, an increase of nearly 500% in three years, according to Trans-Caspian International Transport Route figures. During the same period, container volumes more than doubled from 25,200 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) to 56,500 TEUs, according to that organization. Middle Corridor capacity remains significantly lower than that of competing routes, but regional governments and private enterprise are working to build up port, rail, and warehousing infrastructure to meet future demand.

As part of the Delegation, Mr. Kester spoke personally with the U.S. chargés d’affaires to each of Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia and attended face-to-face meetings with Azerbaijan’s Minister of Economy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Transport, the Chairman of its State Customs Committee, the Chairman of its national railway, Georgia’s Minister and Deputy Minister of Economy, and the Deputy Governor of Kazakhstan’s Mangystau region, through whose ports cargo travels across the Caspian.

The mission highlighted GKG Law’s trade and sanctions practices as well as its specific experience representing clients in the region, and provided an opportunity to share knowledge with regional transportation and logistics companies and financial institutions. Should you have any questions regarding GKG Law’s sanctions, transportation, and logistics practice areas or related to the Delegation itself, please contact John H. Kester at jkester@gkglaw.com.

To read additional coverage of the Delegation as relayed by news articles and U.S. and foreign releases, please see further reading below. (GKG Law does not vouch for accuracy nor does it endorse the opinions of outside persons.)

1. Mangystau.news, 09/05/2025: “Американская бизнес-делегация ознакомилась с логистической инфраструктурой Мангистауской области”
2. Port of Baku, 09/07/2025: “Бизнес-делегация из США посетила Бакинский порт”
3. Lada.kz, 09/06/2025: “Американские компании изучают возможности Среднего коридора: делегация начала визит с Актау”
4. OTPANNEWS.kz, 09/06/2025: “Транзитный потенциал Мангистау был представлен американским инвесторам”
5. Port of Baku – Bakı Liman, 09/07/2025: Facebook Post
6. APA.az, 09/08/2025: “Azerbaijan Railways chairman meets US Business Delegation”
7. AzerNews, 09/08/2025: “Middle Corridor progress underlined in ADY’s meeting with US delegation”
8. Kazakh Invest, 09/08/2025: “U.S. Trade Mission Visits Aktau to Explore the Potential of the Trans-Caspian Route”
9. DHA Press,09/08/2025 : “American business delegation visits Port of Baku”
10. Media.az, 09/08/2025: “Председатель АЖД: Зангезурский коридор обеспечит непрерывность грузопотоков по Среднему коридору”
11. BakuInform, 09/08/2025: “Американская бизнес-делегация посетила Бакинский порт”
12. Xalq Qazeti, 09/08/2025: “Ceyhun Bayramov ABŞ nümayəndələri ilə Vaşinqton razılaşmasının perspektivlərini müzakirə edib”
13. Rəşad Nəbiyev, 09/08/2025: Facebook Post
14. Azərbaycan Dəmir Yolları – ADY, 09/08/2025: Facebook Post
15. Azərbaycan Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi/Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, 09/08/2025: Facebook Post
16. AFEZ – Alat Free Economic Zone, 09/08/2025: Facebook Post
17. Caliber.az, 09/09/2025: “Azerbaijan highlights its role in diversifying Eurasian trade to US delegation”
18. Report.az, 09/09/2025: “US trade mission visits South Caucasus to assess Middle Corridor potential”
19. APA.az, 09/09/2025: “US business delegation visits Baku Port”
20. Report.az, 09/09/2025: “Kenneth Angell: Much broader opportunities will open up for Middle Corridor”
21. AzerNews, 09/09/2025: “Significant opportunities exist to enhance digital, physical connectivity along Middle Corridor”
22. Report.az, 09/09/2025: “US companies invited to take advantage of Azerbaijan’s favorable business, investment climate”
23. The Azerbaijan State News Agency, 09/09/2025: “Mikayil Jabbarov meets US trade mission to discuss Middle Corridor opportunities”
24. MENAFN, 09/09/2025: “Azerbaijan, US Explore Partnership Shots To Diversify Middle Corridor Routes”
25. MENAFN, 09/09/2025: “US Aims To Boost Efficiency Of Middle Corridor – DFC Official”
26. Turkic World, 09/09/2025: “US delegation explores Middle Corridor’s untapped economic potential”
27. The Caspian Post, 09/09/2025: “Azerbaijan, US Discuss Middle Corridor Opportunities”
28. Eurasian Star, 09/09/2025: “US trade mission explores potential of Trans-Caspian Route”
29. Caliber.az, 09/09/2025: “Джаббаров обсудил развитие Среднего коридора с американской делегацией”
30. Day.az, 09/09/2025: “​​Делегация США оценивает потенциал неиспользованных возможностей Среднего коридора”
31. Report.az, 09/09/2025: “Кеннет Энджелл: Для Среднего коридора откроются значительно более широкие возможности”
32. Azerbaycan24, 09/09/2025: “Кеннет Энджелл: Для Среднего коридора откроются значительно более широкие возможности”
33. Far.az, 09/09/2025: “Американская делегация изучает новые возможности в рамках Среднего коридора”
34. Caliber.az, 09/09/2025: “Эрлих: Зангезурский коридор укрепит экспортно-импортные возможности прикаспийских стран”
35. KorrespondenT.az, 09/09/2025: “Азербайджан и США обсудили развитие Среднего коридора и энергобезопасность Европы”
36. NDELIA, 09/09/2025: “Натиг Бахышов: Интерес компаний из США к Южному Кавказу растет”
37. News.am, 09/09/2025: “Кеннет Энджелл: Компании США будут рады возможности участвовать в проектах в рамках Зангезурского коридора”
38. Azegomruk, 09/09/2025: “Sentyabrın 9-da Dövlət Gömrük Komitəsində ölkəmizdə səfərdə olan Amerika Birləşmiş Ştatlarının Orta Dəhliz üzrə Sertifikatlaşdırılmış Ticarət Missiyasının nümayəndələri ilə görüş keçirilib.”
39. AZPromo.az, 09/09/2025: “İqtisadiyyat naziri Mikayıl Cabbarov ABŞ-nin Orta Dəhliz üzrə Sertifikatlaşdırılmış Ticarət Missiyasının nümayəndələri ilə görüşüb.”
40. Mikayil Jabbarov, 09/09/2025: Facebook Post
41. Caliber.az, 09/10/2025: “​​Azerbaijan and China boost transport connectivity”
42. AZE.media, 09/10/2025: “Visit of the American mission to Baku and upcoming talks in Yerevan — A unified strategy”
43. Caspian News, 09/10/2025: “Azerbaijan Ministers, US Trade Mission Discuss Middle Corridor, Energy Routes”
44. Ministry of Economy of the Repubic of Azerbaijan, 09/10/2025: “Meeting held with representatives of US companies”
45. Ports Europe, 09/10/2025: “Azerbaijan Railways meets US business delegation”
46. Minval Politika, 09/10/2025: “Американская миссия высадилась в Баку”
47. Caucasus Watch, 09/11/2025: “Azerbaijan Advances Middle Corridor and TRIPP Projects with Partners”
48. U.S. Embassy Tbilisi, 09/12/2025: “Strengthening U.S.-Georgia Ties through the Middle Corridor”
49. Commersant.ge, 09/12/2025: “U.S. delegation explored opportunities to strengthen U.S.-Georgia cooperation in critical infrastructure, digital trade, new technologies, transportation, and logistics”
50. 1TV.ge, 09/12/2025: “U.S. Embassy highlights strengthened ties as American businesses visit Georgia”
51. SPNEWS, 09/12/2025: “U.S. Business Delegation Visit Reinforces Economic Partnership with Georgia and the Middle Corridor”
52. BM.ge, 09/12/2025: “აშშ-ის ელჩის მოვალეობის შემსრულებელი ამერიკელი ბიზნეს ხელმძღვანელების დელეგაციას და ქართული ბიზნესის და მთავრობის წარმომადგენლებს შეხვდა”
53. BM.ge, 09/12/2025: “რაზე გაამახვილა ყურადღება მარიამ ქვრივიშვილმა აშშ-ის ბიზნესმისიის წარმომადგენლებთან შეხვედრაზე?”
54. 1TV.ge, 09/12/2025: “აშშ-ის საელჩო – ამერიკული ბიზნესების ვიზიტი აძლიერებს აშშ-საქართველოს თანამშრომლობას, ხაზს უსვამს აშშ-ის ერთგულებას ეკონომიკური პარტნიორობის გაღრმავებისა და რეგიონული კავშირების გაძლიერების მიმართ”
55. BP.ge, 09/12/2025: “‘ამერიკული ბიზნესების ვიზიტი ხაზს უსვამს აშშ-ის ერთგულებას ეკონომიკური პარტნიორობის გაღრმავების მიმართ’ – აშშ-ის საელჩო”
56. Sputnik, 09/12/2025: “აშშ-ის საელჩო: ამერიკული ბიზნესების ვიზიტი აძლიერებს აშშ-საქართველოს თანამშრომლობას”
57. Business Continent, 09/12/2025: “აშშ-ის საელჩო: ამერიკული ბიზნესების ვიზიტი აძლიერებს აშშ-საქართველოს თანამშრომლობას”
58. 1TV.ge, 09/12/2025: “Посольство США — Визит американских компаний укрепляет сотрудничество между США и Грузией и подчеркивает приверженность США углублению экономического партнерства и укреплению региональных связей”
59. US Embassy Tbilisi, Georgia, 09/12/2025: Facebook Post
60. AzerNews, 09/13/2025: “US delegation strengthens business ties along Middle Corridor”
61. Trend.az, 09/13/2025: “U.S. expanding co-op with Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan along Middle Corridor”
62. 24.kz, 09/13/2025: “США делают ставку на «Средний коридор»”
63. MENAFN, 09/13/2025: “U.S. Expanding Co-Op With Georgia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan Along Middle Corridor”
64. International Trade Administration, 09/17/2025: “Mapping the TRIPP Ahead: Prosperity in the South Caucasus and Opportunities for U.S. Companies”
65. Trend.az, 09/19/2025: “U.S. business delegation highlights outcomes of Middle Corridor visit”
66. Trend.az, 09/19/2025: “Американская бизнес-делегация подвела итоги визита в регион Среднего коридора”
67. Day.az, 09/19/2025: “Американские бизнес-круги оценили потенциал Среднего коридора”
68. Transport Corridors, 09/19/2025: “«Азербайджанские железные дороги» усиливают позиции на Среднем коридоре.”